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DOES STATE NATIONAL BANK OF BIG SPRING V. GEITHNER
STAND A FIGHTING CHANCE?
DEVON J. STEINMEYER*
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 Financial Crisis sent ripple waves through the domestic and
global financial markets that will keep everyone on their toes for years to
come.1 The crisis prompted Congress to act. After nearly two years of research, hearings, investigations, and negotiations,2 President Obama signed
into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act” or “the Act”).3 The Act has wide-reaching effects on
nearly every aspect of the U.S. economy, not just the financial services
industry.4
Congress’ passage of the Act was not easy and the debate over whether the Act is necessary, constitutional, or economically beneficial still rages
today.5 A recently filed complaint in the D.C. District Court raises constitutional challenges to numerous parts of the Act.6 If the plaintiffs in State
National Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner (“SNB v. Geithner” or “SNB”) are
successful, the decision could dismantle a large portion of the Dodd-Frank
Act.7

*J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Certificate
in Business Law. I would like to thank Professor Michael Wise for his assistance in helping me develop
and articulate my arguments in this paper. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and friends for their
unconditional support throughout law school.
1. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13
N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 7 (2009).
2. See generally Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 23
BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS SEC. & COMM. LAW § 2A:19.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012).
4. Khademian, A.M., The Financial Crisis: A Retrospective, 71 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REVIEW 821, 841 (2011).
5. See generally C. Boyden Gray, Congressional Abdication: Delegation Without Detail and
Without Waiver, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41 (2013); Responsible Consumer Financial Protection
Regulations Act of 2013, S. 205, 113th Cong. (2013).
6. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 42-54, State Nat’l Bank
of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 4229466 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 20, 2012) [hereinafter First Amended SNB Complaint].
7. See Paul Mirengoff, Major Lawsuit Challenges the Constitutionality of Dodd-Frank,
POWERLINE (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2012/06/majorlawsuit-challenges-the-constitutionality-of-dodd-frank.php.
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This note will address constitutional challenges to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) raised in SNB v. Geithner and illustrate why the D.C. District
Court should find in favor of the plaintiffs on some of their challenges. 8
Part I will briefly describe the events that led to the 2008 Financial Crisis,
provide an overview of the Dodd-Frank Act and the legislative history
behind its passage, and provide a summary of the challenges to the DoddFrank Act’s constitutionality raised in SNB v. Geithner. Part II will quickly
address whether the parties in the suit have standing to bring their claims.
Part III will address the Supreme Court’s current separation of powers jurisprudence, as it relates to the SNB Amended Complaint. Finally, Part IV
will use SNB v. Geithner to test the constitutionality of the CFPB and the
FSOC.
I. CAUSES OF THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CONGRESS’ RESPONSE
A. Brief Overview of the 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 Financial Crisis actually started in August 20079 after a
slowing of the global economy and unprecedented decreases in U.S. home
values. 10 Relatively low interest rates during the period encouraged investors to look for high yielding, relatively safe (or so they thought) investment vehicles. 11 Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) backed by
subprime mortgages became commonplace in the market. 12 A CDO is es8. For the purposes of this note, I will only address Counts I and III of the SNB v. Geithner
Amended Complaint. At the outset of my research process, only Counts I through III were included in
the complaint, and for space and time constraints, the portions of the complaint that deal with the
“Orderly Liquidation Authority” will not be discussed or analyzed. Brent Horton provides an in depth
review of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” and its constitutionality. See generally Brent J. Horton,
How Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority for Financial Companies Violates Article III of the
United States Constitution, 36 J. CORP. L. 869 (2011). Additionally, during the writing the of this article
the D.C. Circuit Court struck down the recess appointment of the three of the five members of the
National Labor Relations Board. Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (June 24, 2013). Since Richard Cordray, the Director of the CFPB, was appointed at
the same time as the NLRB members, it stands that his appointment was also unconstitutional; this
obviates the need to discuss Count II. See Financial Regulatory Reform: GOP Senators Continue to
Press Case for CFPB Structural Reform, CCH BANK DIGEST, Vol. 2013-23, Feb. 4, 2013, available at
2013 WL 3836494; Timothy S. Crisp & Ryan N. Parsons, CFPB Powers Could Be Invalidated Following Ruling On NLRB Recess Appointments, Intelligence, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://www.foley.com/cfpb-powers-could-be-invalidated-following-ruling-on-nlrb-recessappointments-01-25-2013/.
9. William Poole, Cause and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 33 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 421, 422 (2010). See generally DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S
WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009).
10. Poole, supra note 9, at 426.
11. Id. at 424.
12. Id.
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sentially a bundle of individual loans (i.e., home loans, car loans, credit
default swaps, etc.) repackaged and sold to investors on the secondary market. 13
At the time, most investors and analysts generally accepted the principle that real estate would continue to appreciate and therefore extended
loans to borrowers who did not have the income or assets to service the
loan; lenders assumed that they would have the appreciated home as collateral and could therefore recoup the loan amount if the borrower defaulted.
However, home values reached unsustainable levels and began to fall,
which in conjunction with increasing adjustable interest rates and a slowing
economy caused many homeowners to default on their home mortgages.
Furthermore, the homeowners were unable to refinance their homes because the value of their mortgages exceeded the values of their homes.
When the individual creditors defaulted, the banks foreclosed on homes
that were worth significantly less than the mortgage value. This decrease in
value directly affected the CDOs that bundled and sold these mortgages.
Once it became apparent that many of the largest financial institutions
in the world had massive exposure to mortgage-backed CDOs, the credit
markets froze. Banks were not willing to or did not have the capacity to
extend credit to other banks and financial institutions, and available liquidity in capital markets around the world dried up.
The financial crisis occurred in several waves. 14 The first wave occurred in March 2008 when financial markets, realizing Bear Sterns was
over-exposed to risky investments, cut off the company’s ability to secure
funding to maintain its operations.15 In order to keep Bear Sterns afloat, the
U.S. Government provided an emergency loan to the company and brokered a deal with JP Morgan to purchase the investment bank. 16 The second wave of the financial crisis occurred on September 15, 2008 when the
U.S. government refused to bail out Lehman Brothers, a company much
larger than Bear Stearns, forcing Lehman to file for bankruptcy protection. 17 The third wave started the day following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing when lending institutions responded by effectively freezing credit
markets. 18 The Government’s determination that American Insurance
13. Neal Deckant, X. Reforms of Collateralized Debt Obligations: Enforcement, Accounting and
Regulatory Proposals, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 79, 80 (2009). CDOs offer varying levels of risk
depending on the “tranche” each investor wishes to enter into, with each “tranche” being independently
rated by credit rating agencies.
14. Poole, supra note 9 at 422-23.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Group (AIG) was “too big to fail” and its subsequent bail out of the company further exacerbated the credit crisis. 19 Finally, after several months,
the credit markets began to loosen and liquidity returned to the markets, but
not after a huge decrease in economic activity and wealth across the
world. 20 Given the tremendous loss in net worth stemming from the financial crisis, it was inevitable that Congressional investigation and action
would occur.
B. Response to the 2008 Financial Crisis
Immediately following the 2008 financial crisis and the bail out of
some of the world’s largest companies, Congress set out to determine what
caused the massive meltdown and how to keep another similar crisis from
occurring. 21 Congress’ answer was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 22 When President Obama signed the
848-page bill, 23 it became the most significant piece of legislation to target
the financial industry since the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 24 Congress passed the Act to “promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” 25 Along with countless new banking and
financial industry regulations, the Act also created two new government
entities. 26 The Act is broken down into eight subchapters, with each subchapter directed at a different issue that surfaced in the wake of the financial crisis. For purposes of this article and the SNB v. Geithner case, only
the following subchapters are relevant. 27

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What it Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 99 (2010-2011).
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012).
23. The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21547784
24. Vitello, supra note 21, at 99.
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, Preamble,
124 Stat 1376 (2010).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012) (establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council); 12 U.S.C.
§ 5491 (2012) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
27. For purposes of this article, the following Subchapters of the Dodd-Frank Act will not be
addressed: Subchapter III (Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, and
the Board of Governors); Subchapter IV (Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision); Subchapter
VI (Federal Reserve System Provisions); and Subchapter VII (Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions).
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1. Subchapter I: Financial Stability
Subchapter I of the Act established the Financial Stability Oversight
Council. The primary purposes of the FSOC are to: (1) identify nonbank
financial companies 28 or bank holding companies that may become “systemically important” and threaten the financial stability of the United States
if they were to fail; (2) provide stability to financial markets and set the
expectation that the Government “will [not] shield [companies] from losses
in the event of failure”; and (3) identify new risks that emerge in the global
financial market. 29 The FSOC includes ten voting members, 30 consisting of
the heads of various other regulatory bodies and five non-voting members.
The FSOC has the power to force the Federal Reserve, following a twothirds majority vote, to designate a nonbank financial company as “systemically important.” A so-designated company must fulfill stringent reporting
and regulatory requirements that the FSOC and Federal Reserve, and notably not Congress, deem necessary. Additionally, the FSOC has the power
to review and overturn any of the CFPB’s regulations and administrative
decisions. 31
2. Subchapter II: Orderly Liquidation Authority
The Act created a systematic approach for dismantling a nonbank financial company whose default “would have serious adverse effects on
financial stability in the United States.” 32 In enacting this provision, Congress attempted to signal that no company was “too big to fail,” and no
matter what the interconnectivity or dependence that the market had on a
company, the government would have a mechanism to liquidate the company. 33

28. 12 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (providing definition of “nonbank financial company”).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
30. Voting members are: the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall serve as Chairperson of the
Council; the Chairman of the Board of Governors; the Comptroller of the Currency; the Director of the
Bureau; the Chairman of the Commission; the Chairperson of the Corporation; the Chairperson of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; the
Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board; and an independent member appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having insurance expertise. 12
U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2012).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b)(2) (2012).
33. Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor’s Perspective, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 259, 272-75 (2011).
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3. Subchapter V: Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, seven agencies34 were involved
in protecting consumers with respect to financial matters. With the passage
of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB became the sole enforcer of the eighteen preexisting consumer protection laws, 35 and the CFPB has the ability to promulgate new rules, as it deems necessary. Arguably, the CFPB is the most
controversial portion of the Dodd-Frank legislation. 36 The main point of
controversy surrounding the CFPB is its structure: namely, whether the
executive or the legislative branches have any meaningful oversight power
in regards to the CFPB’s operations.
The Act meets an almost immediate constitutional challenge in the
SNB v. Geithner lawsuit, the driver of this article, and to this lawsuit we
must now turn.
C. The Facts, Parties, and Claims in SNB v. Geithner
One plaintiff, State National Bank of Big Spring, is located in Big
Spring, Texas, 37 with two other locations in neighboring communities. The
bank, chartered in 1909, is a community bank with less than $275 million
in customer deposits. 38 Another plaintiff, 60 Plus Association, Inc. (“60
Plus”), is a nonprofit senior advocacy group promoting free enterprise and
less government for senior-related issues. 39 Yet another plaintiff, Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”), is an organization dedicated to “advancing
the principles of limited government, free enterprise, and individual liberty.” 40 Just recently, eleven States (Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and West
Virginia) joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs as well.41 SNB alleges various
harms and damages resulting from the Dodd-Frank regulations. Specifical-

34. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)-(7) (2012); Recent Legislation, Administrative Law—Agency Design—
Dodd-Frank Act Creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau-Dodd-Frank Act, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 2123, 2123 (2011) [hereinafter Recent Legislation].
35. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (listing the agencies that transferred their “consumer financial protection
functions” to the Board of Governors).
36. Recent Legislation, supra note 34, at 2123.
37. Big Spring, Texas, is located on Interstate-20 in west central Texas, approximately five hours
due west from the Dallas/Ft. Worth area.
38. Jeff Bater, Three States Join Suit Challenging Constitutionality of Dodd-Frank Reform Law,
99 BANKING REPORT (BNA) 492, 497 (2012).
39. About 60 Plus, 60PLUS.ORG, http://www.60plus.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
40. About CEI, CEI.ORG, http://cei.org/about-cei (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
41. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State Nat’l Bank of Big
Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2013 WL 1909751, at *1 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Second Amended SNB Complaint].
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ly, SNB’s Amended Complaint alleges the following: (1) the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) violates the Constitution’s separation
of powers; (2) President Obama’s appointment of Richard Cordray to the
CFPB violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (3) the
Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; (4) the Orderly Liquidation Authority granted
in Subchapter II violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; (5) the
Orderly Liquidation Authority violates the Due Process Clause; and (6) the
Orderly Liquidation Authority violates the uniform law of bankruptcy pursuant to Article I, Section 8. 42
The Plaintiffs have added various defendants including: (1) Secretary
of the Treasury Timothy Geithner; (2) Director of the CFPB Richard
Cordray; (3) Chairman of the Board of Governors Benjamin Bernanke and
the other members of the Board of Governors; (4) the CFPB; (5) the Financial Stability Oversight Council and its members; and (6) various other
government agencies and directors of those agencies. 43 Essentially, the
Plaintiffs have created an exceedingly large defendant pool by naming
anyone that plays a part in the Dodd-Frank regulations.
SNB argues that the CFPB and its Director, Richard Cordray, have
promulgated rules that unduly constrain the bank’s ability to offer services
to its customers (e.g., CFPB’s regulations forced SNB to drop its international remittance transfer offerings).44 Additionally, SNB alleges that, because the CFPB can retroactively punish the bank for its lending practices,
the bank is constrained in its ability to make business decisions without
knowing what the actual CFPB regulations are, which will ultimately force
the bank to abandon its consumer mortgage business until the CFPB regulations are clear. 45 Finally, SNB asserts that the FSOC’s ability to anoint
certain financial institutions as “systemically important” provides these
institutions with a direct cost-of-capital subsidy. This subsidy stems from
customers and other banks’ views that a bank that is “systemically important” is less risky, and thus is able to obtain financing at a lower rate and
pass the cost savings onto customers. SNB argues that this subsidy directly
harms them because they do not receive the subsidy and thus cannot offer
services at competitive rates.
CEI and 60 Plus each allege that the increased compliance costs associated with the CFPB forces banks to pass costs to customers or drop ser42.
43.
44.
45.

First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at 6-8.
Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 8-9.
Id.
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vice offerings, which directly affects the ability of the members of these
organizations to obtain affordable banking services (e.g., checking accounts, mortgages, credit cards, etc.). 46 Finally, the Attorneys General from
the eleven States that have joined the suit claim that, because their States’
pension funds have investments with financial companies subject to the
“orderly liquidation” provisions of Dodd-Frank, the States would only get
cents on dollar for their investments in such a liquidation, and would be on
the hook for any deficiencies in their employee pension funds. 47
With a base-level understanding of the events that precipitated the
Dodd-Frank Act and the main arguments and facts surrounding the SNB
lawsuit, we can now proceed with the analysis of the claims alleged in SNB
v. Geithner. Congress’ intent to consolidate the regulation of America’s
financial markets and institutions and provide a more efficient, transparent
body of regulations emerges as a common theme in the Dodd-Frank Act.
However, in attempting to create this more coherent financial regulatory
scheme, Congress violated several of the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions. As a threshold issue, it is unclear whether each plaintiff in
SNB v. Geithner has standing to assert it claims, so a brief standing analysis
provides a logical starting point.
II. WHICH PARTIES HAVE STANDING TO ALLEGE THEIR CLAIMS?
In order to engage the wheels of the judiciary, a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to state an actual case or controversy. 48 The case or controversy requirement of Article III is one of the most important mechanisms to
limit the courts, and it functions as a key element of the Constitution’s separation of powers. 49 Both constitutional standing, under Article III, and
court-imposed prudential standing rules limit a court’s ability to hear and
decide a case. 50
The Constitution first requires the plaintiff to show an injury in fact,
which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 51 Second, the injury in fact must have caused the
plaintiff’s injury. “[T]he injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 9-10.
Id. 37-38.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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action of some third party not before the court.’” 52 The third and final requirement of standing is redressability, which, simply stated, means that a
favorable decision for the Plaintiff by the court will benefit the plaintiff or
cure the plaintiff’s injury. 53
On the prudential side of the table, courts have developed three selfimposed limitations on the granting of federal jurisdiction: (1) “the general
prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights;” (2) “the
rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches;” and (3) “the requirement that a
plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.” 54 In order for a plaintiff to have its case heard, it must meet both
the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III and avoid the prudential limitations developed by the courts. The Court in Warth v. Seldin summarized the idea of standing by saying:
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.
This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it
is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of
the courts in a democratic society. 55

There seems to be a common theme running through the standing case
law: if a court wants to get to the merits of the case they will find standing,
and if they do not want to decide the case on the merits they will not find
standing. 56
With a cursory overview of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, we will proceed with a brief analysis of the plaintiffs’ standing in
the SNB v. Geithner case. First, SNB likely has standing to enter the federal
courts and pursue Counts I and II. 57 SNB has alleged an injury in fact: the
inability to provide banking services because of the Dodd-Frank regulations. 58 They have also alleged that the defendants caused their injuries, as
the CFPB’s international remittance transfer regulations caused the bank to
discontinue offering the services. Furthermore, SNB alleges that the
52. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
53. Simon, 426 U.S. at 39.
54. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
55. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citations omitted).
56. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Craig R. Gottlieb, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1994).
57. But see generally Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 8017567 (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 20, 2012).
58. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶ 68.
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CFPB’s open-ended grant of power and the uncertainty surrounding the
ultimate CFPB rules have caused them to stop offering services for fear of
retroactive punishment. Finally, a decision in SNB’s favor would redress
their harm, since they would be able to again offer services that they had to
discontinue because of the enactment and promulgation of the Dodd-Frank
regulations. SNB may not have standing in Count III simply because the
FSOC has yet to designate any “systemically important” nonbank financial
companies, so the controversy is not ripe. 59
We will quickly dispense with the other parties to the suit because
they are irrelevant to the analysis of SNB’s core claims and as such fall
outside of the scope of this article. CEI and 60 Plus likely have standing,
but the court could dismiss their claims as potential “generalized grievance[s].” Michigan, Oklahoma, and South Carolina probably do not have
standing to bring their claims because they have not incurred actual damage; they only allege hypothetical scenarios to challenge the FSOC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. 60
For purposes of this article, we will assume that SNB does have standing to pursue Counts I, II, and III. Working off that assumption, Counts I,
II, and III all raise separation of powers concerns and thus the next section
will survey the Supreme Court’s historical and current separation of powers
jurisprudence.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT SEPARATION OF POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has had a checkered past when it comes to pronouncing a coherent and predictable analytical framework for separation of
powers challenges. 61 The Supreme Court’s decisions are very tough to

59. “Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative
policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148–149 (1967)).
60. Specifically, each plaintiff alleges that “[t]he [State] is ultimately liable for the payment of
pensions . . . and thus any loss of property rights or investment value [attributable to the FSOC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority] directly harms the State.” SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at 10-12. These
plaintiffs could argue that the rules regarding orderly liquidation are clear. It is inevitable that another
large financial institution will be forced into liquidation by the FSOC, so their injury is imminent.
However, this is quite the stretch of an argument.
61. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 506-08 (1989).
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synthesize in theory and even harder to apply in practice.62 This section
will first discuss how the Supreme Court distinguishes procedural or structural separation of powers violations from substantive or theoretical separation of powers violations. Next, this section will zero in on three particular
separation of powers challenges relevant to the SNB v. Geithner case.
A. Separation of Powers, Generally
The first three articles of the Constitution establish the basis of the
separation of powers doctrine. 63 The Constitution created a legislative
branch with a Congress that has the power to make the laws, 64 an executive
branch with a President to execute the laws,65 and a judicial branch with
one Supreme Court, and as many lower courts as Congress deems necessary, to interpret the laws. 66 Separation of powers is an inherently challenging concept to apply because there is not a single “separation of powers
clause” like the Commerce Clause, 67 Appointments Clause, 68 Tax and
Spending Clause, 69 etc. This lack of a separation of powers clause requires
courts to look at all of the applicable provisions of the Constitution that
develop the United States’ tripartite system of government. 70
When an act of one of the branches of government implicates separation of powers concerns, it is usually on a “you know it when you see it”
basis. The inherent ambiguity of the idea requires attorneys, judges, and
legislators to use their intuition to spot potential separation of powers violations. The Supreme Court cases dealing with separation of powers fall into
two rough categories: (1) cases posing structural or procedural separation
of powers concerns; and (2) cases posing substantive separation of powers
concerns. 71
62. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1517-18 (1991); Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional
Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471 (2006).
63. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946, (1983));
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1989).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II.
66. U.S. CONST. art. III.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
70. Jack M. Beerman, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
467, 472 (2011); Elliott, supra note 61, at 508. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (“The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform
to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single
Articles torn from context.”).
71. Beerman, supra note 70, at 472.
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Courts strictly apply the separation of powers provisions when one of
the key “structural aspects,” enumerated above, is violated. Separation of
powers inherent in the Constitution is a product of the structure defined in
the Constitution and the process a particular government action must follow in order to become effective. 72 The key structural and procedural aspects of the Constitution are:
[N]o simultaneous service in the Legislative and Executive Branches of
government; independent election of the President and Congress; an independent judiciary with life tenure and protected compensation; the requirement that all laws be passed by both houses of Congress and
presented to the President, who has the power to veto them; appointment
of executive branch officials, ambassadors, and the like by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate; the Constitution’s specification of the President’s military and foreign affairs powers; and the imposition on the President of the duty to faithfully execute the laws. 73

When an act of one of the branches of government is challenged for
violating the separation of powers, the challenge typically hinges on the
meaning and application of the procedure by which the action was taken
and not an overarching separation of powers theory. 74
For instance, in INS v. Chadha, 75 the Supreme Court effectively ended
the concept of the legislative veto. 76 A legislative veto refers to an act of
Congress that overturns (i.e., vetoes) an act or decision made by the executive branch. 77 Specifically in Chadha, the House of Representatives, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), vetoed the decision of
the executive branch to suspend Chadha’s deportation. 78 The Court struck
down the legislative veto provision in the INA because Congress did not
follow the “finely wrought and exhaustively considered” procedure of bicameralism and presentment. 79
Another example of the Court’s strict adherence to the structural separation of powers provisions occurred in Clinton v. City of New York. 80 In
Clinton, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act 81 because
it essentially gave the President the authority to amend a statute without

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 474.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Id. at 956-58.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1700 (9th ed. 2009).
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927-28.
Id. at 951.
524 U.S. 417 (1998).
2 U.S.C. §§ 691-92 (2000).
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approval from Congress, which is not an enumerated Article II power.82
The Court went to great lengths to differentiate the President’s power to
veto an entire bill and return it to Congress from his power to veto individual line items without Congress approving or rejecting the changes to the
bill; the Court said that the latter was tantamount to legislating. 83 In both
Chadha and Clinton, the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that a
statute, which attempted to alter the key structural aspects of the Constitution, was unconstitutional. 84
However, if Congress leaves untouched the Constitution’s procedural
and structural guarantees, the Supreme Court is much more cautious to
strike down legislation that only raises substantive (i.e., theoretical) separation of powers concerns. 85 Morrison v. Olson 86 is representative of the
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to strike down a statute for only general
and minimal separation of powers violations. In Morrison, the Court upheld a general challenge to the Independent Council (IC) provision of the
Ethics in Government Act, which Congress enacted in the wake of the Watergate Scandal. 87 The important issue in Morrison was whether the overall
scheme enacted by Congress violated the general tripartite construction of
government. 88 Under the scheme, a special D.C. District Court panel could
appoint an IC to investigate “high-ranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws,” and the IC did not report directly to the
Attorney General or any other executive branch member. 89
In dismissing the constitutional challenge, the Morrison Court found
that the IC Appointment Provisions did not: (1) increase the powers of
Congress at the expense of the executive branch; (2) cause judicial usurpation of functions properly reserved for the executive branch; or (3) undermine the powers of the executive branch or tip the balance of power to
Congress by restricting the executive branch’s ability to perform its constitutionally assigned functions. 90 The Court’s holding makes it clear that it
will uphold a general separation of powers provision if only minimal in82. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
83. Id. at 439.
84. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-25 (1976) (finding that the appointment of Federal
Election Commissioners violated the Appointment Clause of the Constitution and thus determining that
a general separation of powers violation occurred was not necessary).
85. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 476; Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Beerman, supra note 70, at 476.
86. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
87. Id. at 658.
88. Id. at 660.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 694-96.
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fringement of a branch occurs or if the branch retains sufficient control
over a constitutionally assigned function. 91 However, in a more recent case,
the Court “recognized that the three branches are not hermetically sealed
from one another, but it remains true that Article III imposes some basic
limitations that the other branches may not transgress.” 92
As the case law seems to suggest, it is helpful to break down the analysis into bipartite relationships when reviewing whether a statute impermissibly violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. These
relationships pose three typical questions and will each be discussed in
turn: (1) Did Congress pass a law usurping power belonging to the executive branch under Article II?; (2) Did Congress pass a law delegating its
legislative authority under Article I to the executive branch?; and (3) Did
Congress pass a law usurping power belonging to the judicial branch under
Article III?
B. Did Congress Pass a Law Usurping Power Belonging to the Executive
Branch Under Article II?
Congress has, at times, enacted legislation that went beyond the “legislative sphere” 93 and encroached on the executive branch’s power. To
ensure that this encroachment does not occur, the Supreme Court has developed two basic restraints on Congress: (1) it may not “invest itself or its
Members with . . . executive . . . power” 94 and (2) “when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the ‘single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures’ specified in Article I.” 95
The first restraint, properly characterized as a substantive or theoretical restraint, was illustrated most recently in Bowsher v. Synar, 96 where the
Supreme Court found that the Comptroller General’s role under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 97 unconstitutionally usurped executive power from the executive branch. 98 In the event
91. Id. at 696. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 972-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the legislative veto did not take enough power away from the executive branch to warrant striking
down the statute). See generally Matthew James Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme
Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961 (1995).
92. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011), reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011) (citations
omitted).
93. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252, 274 (1991).
94. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
95. Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (1988).
98. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.
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a budget deficit existed, the Comptroller General’s role was to review and
make spending reduction recommendations of the program-by-program
budgets submitted by the Directors of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 99 The Comptroller General reported his findings to the President who was then required
to enter an order based on the Comptroller’s recommendations to the budgets of all governmental agencies. 100 The Court struck down the Comptroller General’s role because it was effectively an execution of the laws,
exclusively reserved for the executive branch, but the President had no
control over the Comptroller, only Congress did. 101
Another purely procedural challenge is best exemplified in I.N.S. v.
Chadha. 102 As previously discuss, the Court found § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional because it violated the bicameralism and presentment provisions of the Constitution. 103 The Court
reasoned that, even though Congress had the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” one house alone could not act in a legislative
function to alter the rights of anyone except under express language from
the Constitution, but that is precisely what § 244(c)(2) allowed Congress to
do. 104 The one-House veto of the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation with respect to Chadha was a legislative act, and for such acts the
Constitution mandated bicameralism and presentment. 105 Some restraints
have both procedural and theoretical separation of powers foundations.
For instance, the President has the power to appoint principal officers
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,106 which is key to his
responsibility to faithfully execute the laws. 107 Along with this power is the
President’s “power to oversee executive officers through removal.” 108 Although the Constitution gives the President his removal powers, the Supreme Court has sanctioned limits on those powers by upholding
congressionally crafted “for cause” removal requirements as long as those
requirements do not “impermissibly burden[] the President’s power to con-

99. Id. at 717-19.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 740-41.
102. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
103. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
104. Id. at 953-56 (quotations omitted).
105. Id. at 958-59.
106. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a good overview of the Appointment Clause, see Matthew
Hunter, Legislating Around the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. REV. 753 (2011).
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
108. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010).
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trol or supervise” the executive branch.109 Although Congress has the power to enact “for cause” removal requirements on officers appointed by the
President, the decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board places limits on this power. 110
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court reviewed the congressionally enacted scheme that prohibited the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from removing Public Company Account Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) members except “for good cause shown.” 111 Congress then
insulated the SEC members by requiring the President to show “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” to warrant removal. 112 This
double layer of protection made it so the President could “neither ensure
that the [PCAOB’s] laws [were] faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a [PCAOB] member’s breach of faith.” 113 The Court found the “dual for-cause” restrictions contravened the Constitution’s separation of
powers provisions by removing the President’s ability to faithfully execute
the law. 114
Although Congress has the power to construct inventive ways to legislate, it cannot do so in such a way that gives it executive-type powers or
impermissibly removes the President’s power to oversee the executive
branch. The next subsection will address potential issues that arise when
Congress gives away its legislative authority.
C. Did Congress Pass a Law Delegating its Legislative Authority Under
Article I to the Executive Branch?
1. Intelligible Principles
The idea of nondelegation “is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government,” 115 and Congress generally “cannot delegate its legislative power to another
[b]ranch.” 116 Congress does have the power to provide guidelines to other
branches and administrative agencies, which allow those agencies to develop and enforce the laws, as long as “Congress clearly delineates the general

109. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988). See also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
110. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153.
111. Id. at 3148.
112. Id. at 3154.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3155.
115. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
116. Id. at 372.
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policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this
delegated authority” to enable courts to properly analyze and adjudicate
disputes. 117 The Court has coined this the “intelligible principle” concept 118 and has only struck down two statutes because they lacked an intelligible principle. 119 Thus, it appears that the “intelligible principle” standstandard is fairly low, similar to that of the “minimum rationality” test120
under the Equal Protection clause. 121
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations provides a clear picture
of the Supreme Court’s current non-delegation doctrine. 122 Multiple private
parties and several States brought claims in the D.C. District Court alleging
that § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegated Congress’ legislative power to the Administrator of the Environment Protection Agency
(EPA). 123 “Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air
quality standards ‘the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect the public health’ with ‘an adequate margin of safety.’”124
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s findings that
§ 109(b)(1) impermissibly delegated legislative power to the EPA because
the language of the statute did not provide an intelligible principle to limit
the EPA’s administrative authority to regulate. 125 However, the D.C. Circuit refrained from striking down the statute as unconstitutional by assuming that the EPA employed a “restrictive construction” of the statute. 126
The Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the lower
courts. 127 The Supreme Court quickly dismissed the notion that an administrative agency could make an unconstitutional delegation of authority
constitutional by simply declining to extend some of the power Congress
delegated to it. 128 Next, the Court found that the word “requisite” in the
117. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
118. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
119. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (guidance providing
that administrative agency must foster “fair competition” was not sufficient to uphold the agency’s
power to regulate substantially all of the U.S. economy); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
430 (1935) (statute that provided absolutely no guidance for the exercise of discretion violated nondelegation doctrine).
120. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (discussing minimum rationality); City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (same); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (same).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
122. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
123. Id. at 462.
124. Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1977)).
125. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 1038.
127. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (summarizing the holding).
128. Id. at 473.
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statute, which referred to the appropriate level of air quality standards necessary to protect the public health, provided an adequately intelligible principle for the EPA to regulate appropriately.
Moreover, the Court in Whitman specifically noted that it had only
found a statute lacking an intelligible principle in two cases, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.129
The Court seemed to suggest these two cases marked the “outer limits” of
the nondelegation doctrine, and as such the Court would only strike down
statutes that fell beyond those limits.130 However, the Court did leave the
door open to a potential nondelegation challenge when it said, “the degree
of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the
power congressionally conferred.” 131 This assertion creates a sliding scale
approach to the intelligible principle doctrine where the greater the scope of
power conferred to an administrative agency, the more intelligible Congress’ principle must be.
2. Power of the Purse
Congress can also improperly delegate its constitutional right to enact
appropriations bills. The Constitution places the “power of the purse” 132
squarely in Congress’ hands. 133 The “Necessary and Proper Clause” 134 and
the “Appropriations Clause” 135 define Congress’ power of the purse. Article I, section 8, grants Congress the power to enact “Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the] Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.”136 Moreover,
“Article I, section 8 also grants Congress the obverse power . . . to prevent
the spending of public funds except as authorized by Congress.” 137 Finally,

129. Id. at 474 (referring to A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).
130. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474 (providing a listing of cases and statutes that the Supreme Court
upheld and conferring an intelligible principle).
131. Id. at 475. See also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996) (“Had the delegations here called for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the traditional authority of
the President, Loving’s last argument that Congress failed to provide guiding principles to the President
might have more weight.”).
132. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 86 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“That the governmental
power of the purse is a great one is not now for the first time announced.”).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
137. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988) (“If Congress
could not prohibit the Executive from withdrawing funds from the Treasury, then the constitutional
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the Appropriations Clause of Article I 138 limits Congress’ power to expend
funds to instances when it properly passes an appropriation bill. 139 Congress’ power to control the spending of the federal government is one of its
most powerful tools 140 and serves as an important check on executive
branch actions. 141
To sum up, if Congress decides to delegate some of its legislative authority to the executive branch, it must tread carefully and provide adequate
guidance, and in no case should Congress delegate its power of the purse.
The final subsection will address the usurpation of the judiciary’s power.
D. Did Congress Pass a Law Usurping Power Belonging to the Judicial
Branch Under Article III?
In determining whether a particular statute infringes on the judicial
branch’s authority, the Court will look to whether the “institutional integrity” of the judiciary is threatened.142 The Court’s review has not been based
on “formalistic and unbending rules.” 143 Rather, the Court has reviewed the
extent to which the “essential attributes of [Article III] judicial power”144
are transferred to non-Article III tribunals, the level of influence or power
the non-Article III tribunal has, the type of right being adjudicated, and
Congress’ rationale for changing the typical adjudication process. 145

grants of power to the legislature to raise taxes and to borrow money would be for naught because the
Executive could effectively compel such legislation by spending at will.”).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
139. Stith, supra note 137, at 1349.
140. Id. at 1360; Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (“However much money may be in
the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned. Any other course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous discretion.”).
141. See also, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (“Boland I”
prohibiting CIA use of appropriated funds “for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua”); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (“Boland II” prohibiting
the CIA, Department of Defense “or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities” from spending “funds available” in support of the contras).
142. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC) v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
143. Id. at 851 (“Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of the
law, they might also unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to
its Article I powers.”). See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586
(1985).
144. The “essential attributes of judicial power” include “the power to issue final judgments, the
lack of judicial review or review only on a highly deferential standard, the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus and preside over jury trials, and jurisdiction over state law claims.” Beerman, supra note
70, at 496. See also J. Anthony Downs, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of Final Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1032, 1042-45 (1985) (discussing the “essential attributes of judicial power”).
145. See, e.g., CFTC, 478 U.S. at 851; Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587, 589-93.
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For instance, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the
Court set out to determine whether the Commodity Exchange Act146
properly empowered the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to adjudicate state law counterclaims in a customer reparations action. 147 In
Schor, the Court upheld the CFTC’s authority to adjudicate state law counterclaims because the CFTC only adjudicated a “particularized area of
law,” 148 and parties could choose whether or not to have the CFTC adjudicate their claims. 149 Conversely, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court
determined that non-Article III bankruptcy courts could not, constitutionally, adjudicate counterclaims arising in or under a Title 11 bankruptcy
case. 150 The Court distinguished Stern from its prior decision in Schor by
pointing out that in Schor the CFTC was merely an agency, whereas in
Stern, the statute created an entirely separate non-Article III court.151
In addition, when assessing the constitutionality of a given statute, the
Supreme Court will look to any restrictions Congress places on the Article
III court’s ability to review agency decisions. Administrative government is
an ever-increasing function within our tripartite system, and its legitimacy
is “inextricably intertwined” with judicial review.152 Not only does the
ability given to Article III courts by congressionally-enacted statutes to
review executive agency decisions provide a check on the executive and
legislative branches, but it also prohibits rogue agencies from operating
outside the confines of the Constitution. 153 The Supreme Court has recognized the right of Congress to prohibit judicial review but only in instances
where Congress provided “‘clear and convincing’ evidence” of its intent
“to restrict access to judicial review.” 154
The structure, jurisdiction, and procedures Congress crafts for a nonArticle III tribunal are of the utmost constitutional importance. Furthermore, when Congress does grant non-Article III tribunals the right to hear
and decide issues, the availability of review and the standard of review
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1936).
147. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 835-36.
148. Id. at 852 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85
(1982)).
149. The Court also discussed the adjudication of public versus private rights, the procedural
aspects of the CFTC’s adjudicatory process, and the “weight of evidence” standard of review of CFTC
Orders by the District Courts. CFTC, 478 U.S. at 852-54.
150. 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611, reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011).
151. Id. at 2615.
152. Sidney A. Shapiro, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 395 (1987).
153. Id. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
154. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 141 (1967).
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authorized by Congress play an increasingly large role in the separation of
powers analysis.
As illustrated by the length of the “brief” exposition of the separation
of powers jurisprudence, the idea is complicated, and in general, prior case
law only provides a rough framework for analysis. With an understanding
of the separation of powers jurisprudence, it is now time to assess SNB’s
claims.
IV. SNB’S SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGES
The Dodd-Frank Act is an attempt by Congress to create new and inventive ways to legislate and govern, and with respect to the FSOC, it did
not undermine the Constitution. Unfortunately, the structure Congress enacted for the CFPB twists and transfers power in ways that violate the Constitution. In terms of SNB v. Geithner, and with respect to the FSOC and
CFBP, the following questions arise: First, did Congress usurp any power
from the executive branch that would violate the Constitution’s separation
of powers? Second, did Congress delegate too much of its own legislative
power to the executive branch under the Dodd-Frank Act? Third, do the
restraints or adjudicatory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act unconstitutionally usurp the Judiciary’s powers? The CFPB will be first to enter the constitutional gauntlet.
A. SNB’s Assault on the CFPB
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, it became abundantly clear that
Congress was going to act in some fashion. Most will agree that certain
aspects of the CFPB’s purpose and objectives provide necessary consumer
protections. 155 However, by attempting to isolate the CFPB from political
pressures and special interests, Congress created an entity that violates the
Constitution’s separation of powers. First, Congress stripped the President
of his ability to effectively control, review, and oversee the CFPB, an executive agency. Second, although the guiding principle Congress enacted is
likely intelligible, and thus constitutional, Congress improperly delegated
its power over the public fisc to the Director of the CFPB. Finally, while
the deference afforded to the CFPB by the courts is constitutional, the
combination of minimal executive branch oversight, almost no Congres-

155. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012); See also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5878 (daily ed. July 15, 2010)
(statement of Sen. Todd); Alec C. Covington, Fighting Yesterday’s Battles: Proposed Changes to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 299, 302-04 (2012).
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sional oversight, and only minimal judicial review creates an unconstitutional independent agency answerable to no one.
1. Executive Branch Problems
The SNB v. Geithner Amended Complaint raises several executive
branch separation of powers concerns. First, even though the CFPB is an
executive agency, 156 Congress has removed nearly all of the President’s
tools to hold the CFPB accountable. No other agency, nor the electorate,
has enough power to hold the CFPB accountable either. For instance, although the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 157 ceded significant
administrative authority to the CFPB, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 completely removed the Board of Governors from the equation and thus insulated the
CFPB from presidential review via the Board of Governors. Under Subchapter V, the Board of Governors has no power to: (1) scrutinize CFPB
adjudicatory actions; (2) appoint, direct, or remove any officer or employee
of the CFPB; (3) reorganize the CFPB; or (4) approve or review any rule
promulgated by the CFPB.158 The CFPB is a wholly separate, distinct, and
independent executive agency.
With the Board of Governors removed, the CFPB is able to operate
without meaningful review by the President, and “[t]his contravenes the
President’s ‘constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the
laws.’” 159 This added layer of protection and autonomy granted to the
CFPB is eerily reminiscent of the “dual for-cause” 160 removal restriction
with which Congress insulated the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB or the “Board”) under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.161
Although the CFPB is not protected by a “dual for-cause” removal
provision, the CFPB’s protections are even stronger. First, the CFPB does
not have a direct superior agency watching over it, like the SEC watched
over the PCAOB. With regards to PCAOB, the SEC had the power to “approve the Board’s budget, § 7219(b), issue binding regulations, §§ 7202(a),
7217(b)(5), relieve the Board of authority, § 7217(d)(1), amend Board
sanctions, § 7217(c), or enforce Board rules on its own, §§ 7202(b)(1),
156. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).
157. The Board of Governors is made up of seven individuals that are appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to fourteen-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(2) (2012).
159. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)).
160. For-cause removal is in contrast to at-will removal, where the President or superior officer is
not required to show any reason for removing the principal or inferior officer. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.
Ct. at 3142.
161. 152 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (2002).
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(c).” 162 Similar restraints do not hamper the CFPB. In fact, only the FSOC
maintains any sort of supervisory capacity over the CFPB, and that supervision is limited.
The FSOC has the power to review regulations 163 promulgated by the
CFPB, but it can only overturn regulations if two-thirds of the FSOC members believe the regulation poses a threat to the “safety and soundness” or
“the stability of the [United States’] financial system.” 164 The statute provides no guidance to the FSOC to make their determinations and very few,
if any, cases, regulations, or scholarly articles address the “safety and
soundness” standard, thus making it very ambiguous. Without a clear
standard from Congress, it becomes nearly impossible to articulate a meaningful standard to assess whether the “safety and soundness” of the U.S.
financial system is threatened. A standard that is triggered only when the
entire U.S. financial system is at risk is not really a standard at all, and as
such, the FSOC’s supervisory role is largely irrelevant. 165
Next, Congress vested too much power in the Director of the CFPB
with too little oversight. The President can only remove the Director “for
cause,m” and although SNB does not necessarily challenge the premise of
a “for cause” removal restriction, SNB does challenge the CFPB’s particular “for cause” removal restriction because the CFPB has only one Director, not a board or commission of multiple leaders. From a practical
standpoint, the CFPB functions more like an “independent agency” than an
“executive agency.” 166
For instance, the CFPB: (1) makes its own regulations; (2) provides
interpretations of the statutes it oversees; (3) enforces and adjudicates disputes under the statutes it oversees; and (4) has subject matter expertise in a
highly particularized area of administrative law.167 These characteristics

162. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158.
163. The FSOC does not have the power to review CFPB orders and decisions in adjudicatory
proceedings. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2) (2012) (listing the duties delegated to the FSOC).
164. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2012).
165. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 891-92 (2012); Alan
Charles Raul, CFPB Lacks Constitutional Checks and Balances, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:19 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/206583-alan-charles-raul-former-vicechairman-of-the-privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board.
166. Congress has not provided a definition for “independent agency.” However, in 1980, it listed
sixteen “independent agencies” in the Paper Reduction Act, and multi-member commissions or boards
controlled all of those agencies. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The
Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1137 (2000).
167. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 26162 (1988).
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are common of independent agencies. 168 But, what is alarming is that only
one person controls the CFPB, and the President can only remove the
CFPB’s Director for good cause shown. 169 The CFPB’s structure provides
the Director with independence in adjudicatory decision-making, which is
desirable, but other co-Directors do not moderate his decisions, nor is the
Director monitored by a supervisory agency. 170 The “for cause” removal
restriction is fundamentally different than similar restrictions on other
agencies for the simple reason that one person, not a group, controls the
CFPB. This distinction is important because it transforms an executive
agency under the control of the President into a hybrid independent agency
that lacks the checks and balances of a commission-type leadership structure. 171
Finally, one other provision of Subchapter V, which further insulates
the CFPB from executive branch review, is troubling. Even though the
CFPB is an “executive agency” by statute, 172 the President has no ability to
review or comment, let alone, approve “legislative recommendations, or
testimony or comments on legislation” before the CFPB makes those recommendations, testimony, or comments to Congress. 173 Furthermore, any
views expressed by the Director or CFPB officer to Congress “do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors or the President.”174
This lack of oversight is similar to that of the Comptroller’s position in
Bowsher v. Synar, and the Court found that structure unconstitutional because the President did not maintain enough control of the executive agency. 175 SNB’s Amended Complaint highlights and challenges several key
provisions of Dodd-Frank that may be unconstitutional, and SNB has a
good chance of prevailing on those challenges, which would basically dismantle the CFPB.
168. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935) (discussing the duties of the
Federal Trade Commission); United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1159-60 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(discussing the typical characteristics of independent agencies); George F. Fraley, III, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1240-43 (1996) (same).
169. GOP Senators Continue to Demand CFPB Structural Reform, 2505 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(Feb. 6, 2013), available at 2013 WL 3835802.
170. In Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Dissent’s key contention was that the SEC still maintained sufficient control over the PCAOB, and as such, the President also maintained sufficient control
over the PCAOB. But as has already been shown, the CFPB does not have a big brother, like the SEC,
to watch over it and keep it in line. 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3172-73 (2010).
171. Breger & Edles, supra note 166, at 1137. See Verkuil, supra note 167, at 260 (providing an
analysis of the common and distinguishing characteristics of independent agencies).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012).
173. 12 U.S.C. § 5492(c)(4) (2012).
174. Id.
175. 478 U.S. 714, 731-32 (1986).
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2. Legislative Branch Problems
SNB also raises two legislative branch separation-of-power concerns.
First, SNB challenges the constitutionality of the CFPB’s power to promulgate regulations and enforce laws that protect consumers from “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices.” 176 Second, SNB alleges that
Congress unconstitutionally tied its own hands by relinquishing its power
of the purse.
SNB faces an uphill battle with respect to its nondelegation claim that
the language “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts” in Congress’ directive to
the CFPB was impermissibly vague and removed Congress’ legislative
power. The Supreme Court has, so far, only found two statutes lacking an
intelligible principle, that is, where an administrative agency could not
reliably promulgate regulations based on the statutes. 177
Unfortunately for SNB, 12 U.S.C. § 5531 provides an intelligible
principle by which the CFPB can create regulations reasonably designed to
protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.” 178 Although Congress conferred significant authority to the CFPB, the definitions
Congress provided meet the relatively low “intelligible principle” standard
in light of the case law in the area.179 Congress’ intelligible principles pro176. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012).
177. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Both of these cases were decided prior to the “Switch in Time That
Saved Nine,” which marked a change in the Supreme Court’s voting that occasioned a more expansive
federal government. See United States v. Rothacher, 442 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000-01, 1001 n.1 (D. Mont.
2006); Alan C. Kohn, A Legal Essay: The Judicial Activism Myth, 67 J. MO. B. 106, 109 (2011), available at http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Journal/2011/03-04/A%20Legal%
20Essay%20The%20Judicial%20Activism%20Myth.pdf.
178. Congress provided that “unfairness” must cause “or [be] likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers” that is unavoidable and that “such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.” 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2012). Congress also allows the CFPB
to use public policy as one basis for determining unfairness, as long as it is not the primary basis. Id. An
act or practice is abusive if it (1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage of:
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting
or using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
179. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of
authority to determine excessive profits); Am. Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 , 105 (1946)
(upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426
(1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and
equitable, and would effectuate purposes of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to
determine just and reasonable rates); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943)
(upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing “as
public interest, convenience, or necessity” require).
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vide the CFPB with sufficient guidance to promulgate adequate rules.
SNB’s challenge to the CFPB on nondelegation grounds is weak at best.
SNB’s assertion that Congress impermissibly tied its own hands with
respect to the CFPB’s funding is a stronger argument. The Supreme Court
recently stated that the “separation of powers does not depend on the views
of individual [Sessions of Congress], nor on whether ‘the encroached-upon
branch approves the encroachment.’” 180 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that
the power to appropriate money is vested solely in Congress, and the Constitution does not allow Congress to transfer this power to any other branch
or agency. 181 But that is exactly what Congress did with the Act. The
CFPB, through its Director, is allowed to set its own budget without congressional, or any other entity’s, approval. 182 The budget amount is capped
at twelve percent 183 of the Federal Reserve System’s appropriated funds,
but that is the only restriction. 184
Although the CFPB’s budget is transferred from the Federal Reserve
System’s budget, which helps enforce the twelve percent cap, it does not
help the fact that the CFPB is empowered to unilaterally appropriate its
owns funds. In the future, even if Congress challenges the CFPB’s budget,
its only course of action would be to shrink the Federal Reserve’s budget,
which would shrink the amount but not the percentage available to the
CFPB. This mechanism for controlling the CFPB’s appropriations is dangerous because it potentially harms the Federal Reserve without the Federal
Reserve having any control over the situation. Furthermore, Congress gave
the CFPB a $200,000,000 rainy day fund: in the event that the CFPB
spends more than it budgeted, all the Director has to do is submit a report
to Congress and up to two hundred million dollars is available to the
CFPB, 185 with no approval required. 186
In summary, SNB’s claim that Congress provided the CFPB with an
open-ended grant of power without an intelligible principle to guide the
CFPB’s regulations and decisions is probably not meritorious because of
the adequate definitions Congress provided. However, SNB does raise
180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) (citations omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992)).
181. See supra notes 132-141 and accompanying text.
182. 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2012).
183. Adjusted annually for inflation. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(B).
184. Federal Reserve System actual expenditures for 2011, the last year formally reported, were
$4.4 billion. ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET REVIEW 2012, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM 2 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/budgetreview/files/2012-budget-review.pdf.
185. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(e)(2).
186. Id. The two hundred million dollar cushion is available through 2014.
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legitimate concerns about Congress’ delegation of appropriations power to
the CFPB, since the CFPB submits its budget for approval to no one, and
Congress does not have a safe mechanism to control their funding.
3. Judicial Branch Problems
Finally, SNB’s Amended Complaint raises questions regarding the
level of deference a reviewing court is required to give to the CFPB’s interpretations of its rules. 187 All CFPB decisions and actions are subject to
chapter V of Title V of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),188 and
thus all final decisions are reviewable, first by the District Court and second by the Court of Appeals. 189 No constitutional concerns exist regarding
this process. SNB only alleges one constitutional issue with respect to the
appeal process: the level of deference given to CFPB interpretations.
Regarding any Federal consumer financial law,190 the reviewing court
must defer to the CFPB “as if the [CFPB] were the only agency authorized
to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal
consumer financial law.” 191 Normally courts afford Chevron deference to
administrative agency regulations and interpretations when Congress leaves
a gap in the statute, so it is unclear exactly what Congress was attempting
to convey with this language. 192
However, since the CFPB subsumed the consumer protection laws
from eighteen other agencies, the provision likely means that Chevron deference is afforded to all new CFPB interpretations, and all prior interpretations by the respective agencies are binding as if the CFPB issued the
regulation or interpreted the statute. This language will also allow the
CFPB to trump any interpretations by other agencies that are contrary to its
own. Given that the Supreme Court has sanctioned legislative action based
on Chevron-type deference in other agency schemes, there do not appear to
be any constitutional issues here.
To summarize SNB’s challenges to the CFPB and the provisions that
establish and guide the CFPB are novel, and some of them pass constitu187. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 105, 138.
188. 12 U.S.C. § 5563 (2012). This section refers to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1966. 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012).
189. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2012).
190. Defined in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(14) (2012).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (2012).
192. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“When Congress has ‘explicitly left a
gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation,’ and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”)).
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tional muster. Unfortunately, the biggest problem with Congress’ attempt
to protect the independence of the CFPB is that it failed to provide adequate checks on the CFPB’s power. The CFPB operates on its own island,
the President can only remove the Director for cause shown, and no other
agency has actual supervisory authority over the CFPB. The CFPB is also
single-headed, not multi-headed like other similarly situated independent
agencies. Congress also removed its power to influence and control the
scope of the CFPB by relinquishing its power of the purse. The Director
sets his own budget, and as long as the Federal Reserve System receives
funds, the CFPB receives funds. Finally, in a vacuum, the judicial review
provisions of the CFPB are constitutional, but when combined with very
minimal control by the legislative and executive branches, the entire CFPB
scheme violates the fundamental idea of our tripartite form of government.
Thus it appears that SNB raised some winning and some losing arguments as to the constitutionality of the CFPB. SNB attempts to weave similar constitutional arguments regarding the FSOC, but the powers Congress
conferred to the FSOC do not raise the same concerns as those raised by
the creation of the CFPB.
B. SNB’s Assault on the FSOC
SNB argues that Congress provided an open-ended grant of power
(i.e., an unintelligible principle) to designate nonbank “systemically important” financial institutions (SIFIs) without proper judicial review and no
third-party remedy to challenge the FSOC’s determinations. 193 However,
SNB’s claims fall short of establishing a violation of the Constitution’s
separation of powers concepts.
First, Congress committed an entire section of the Dodd-Frank Act to
dictate what the FSOC is required to consider and the process it is required
to follow to designate a nonbank financial company as “systemically important.” 194 Congress enumerated eleven principles, with multiple elements
to each, which the FSOC must evaluate when making its designations.
Furthermore, Congress requires the FSOC to work with other financial
agencies when making their determinations, and ultimately, the FSOC must
report to Congress and justify its determinations.
Second, the deference granted to the FSOC, and consequently the limitations placed on judicial review, are constitutional because of the complexity involved in determining which companies are “systemically
193. First Amended SNB Complaint, supra note 6, ¶207.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
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important.” A SIFI designation is appealable by the nonbank financial
company receiving the designation, and the reviewing court can rescind the
FSOC’s determination if the decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”195
SNB argues that the appropriate standard of review in an Article III
court for an administrative agency’s final decision is whether the decision
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 196 The omission of “otherwise not in accordance with
law” from Dodd-Frank is curious, but the potential impact seems absurd:
an FSOC SIFI determination could break the law? This is not possibly what
Congress had in mind when it left out the phrase “otherwise in accordance
with law.”
Furthermore, Congress can alter the standard of review of agency decisions for compelling reasons, 197 and prior case law supports a change in
the standard of judicial review when the decision of the agency relates to
complex financial concepts and markets and requires specialized expertise
to fully understand. 198 In most cases, judges do not, nor are they required
to, understand what a “systemically important” nonbank financial entity is,
and thus an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is constitutionally
permissible.
Next, SNB avers that it should, as a third party, be able to challenge an
FSOC’s determination of whether a nonbank financial company is a SIFI or
not, because a SIFI designation will work to lower the risk of that company
and thus give it a cost-of-capital competitive advantage in the market. At
the outset, the Act does not expressly forbid a third party from appealing a
decision by the FSOC. Section 5323(h) speaks only of the right, of a nonbank financial company receiving the designation, to appeal the determination, but 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.” Since no decision interpreting § 5323(h) currently exists, SNB
could attempt to challenge an FSOC determination, once one is actually
made.
195. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
197. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 830 (2010); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Services, Inc., 509 U.S.
43, 63-64 (1993) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), abrogated by Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
198. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) (declaring that, when a court is reviewing a dispute
that rests squarely in the expertise of the agency charged with making the decision, the court must
afford the agency substantial deference); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (when a court reviews complex scientific issues, it must be “at its most deferential”).
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Assuming SNB can challenge a SIFI designation, its allegation that a
SIFI will be viewed as “too big to fail” and thus receive government backing in the event of financial distress, which will in turn lower the risk and
cost of capital of that firm, is precisely what Dodd-Frank seeks to discourage, that is, allowing and perpetuating “too big to fail” companies. 199 Thus,
SNB’s argument must fail. The purpose of a SIFI designation is to monitor
“systemically important” companies and limit their potential negative influence on the market, but in the event that a “systematically important”
company fails, Congress made it clear that it would not bail the company
out. 200 Instead, Congress established the Orderly Liquidation Authority to
ensure that a failing company is wound down with as little disruption as
possible to the markets. 201 Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly authorizes the failure of “systemically important” companies, and thus a SIFI
determination, and the potential for a government bailout, in no way reduces the risk and cost of capital of a SIFI-designated firm.
Additionally, even if SNB’s proposition that a SIFI designation
equates to an implicit understanding that the U.S. Government will bail out
the company, the designation is still largely irrelevant, if one assumes financial markets are efficient.202 If markets are efficient, then they already
know which nonbank financial companies are “systemically important”
(and would receive government assistance in the event of failure regardless
of the Dodd-Frank provisions) and have thus adjusted the risk related to
those companies. With that assumption in place, an FSOC “systemically
important” determination will have no effect on its cost of capital, so an
FSOC determination is largely irrelevant.
Overall, SNB’s Amended Complaint fails to raise sufficient separation
of powers concerns related to the FSOC. Congress provided an intelligible
principle that the FSOC can apply to designate SIFIs, and the lowered level
of judicial scrutiny is warranted given the complexity of the SIFI determination process. While SNB’s right, as a third party, to challenge an FSOC
199. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, Preamble,
124 Stat 1376 (2010) (“An Act To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
other purposes.”); but see generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011).
200. 156 CONG. REC. H5234 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Frank).
201. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012). See Wilmarth, supra note 199, at 993.
202. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assumes that securities reflect all available information at a given point in time and are thus priced perfectly at that instant. Burton G. Malkiel, The
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 59 (2003). EHM theory also assumes that “markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting aboveaverage risks.” Id. at 60.
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determination likely exists, SNB’s arguments are unavailing because of
Congress’ creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority and the idea of
efficient markets.
CONCLUSION
The 2008 Financial Crisis was a very trying time for the United States,
and it exposed many weaknesses in our financial system. Congress set out
to mend those weaknesses. In some respects it succeeded, but in others it
violated the Constitution by defining administrative agencies that lack sufficient controls. The SNB v. Geithner case attempts to expose those unconstitutional provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, and has a chance to prevail
where Congress has erred.

